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Yoshizaki: The Value Shift of Japanese Youth

THE VALUE SHIFT
OF JAPANESE YOUTH
Yasuhiro Yoshizaki
1
Japanese postwar systems and values such as anti-militarism, democracy,
diligence, hard work, and cooperation have worked effectively for achievement
of an industrial and economical success during the fifty years after the total defeat
and devastating destruction in the War. It is a widely accepted view that all postwar systems in Japan had been carefully designed in pursuit of effective industrial production and marketing. The education system had been controlled to produce a standardized and diligent work force. Political emphasis was placed upon
encouragement of certain strategic industries; and economic policies favored
large corporations rather than the consumers. Though it is analogous, to a certain
extent, to the expansion of capital at the expense of underpaid workers in United
States companies in the latter nineteenth century, Japanese companies paid much
more attention to the welfare of their workers and guaranteed their lifetime
employment. That was how the postwar Japan achieved industrial success.
But now that a half century has passed, the values as well as the system itself
are going through drastic changes, recognized by only a few outside Japan and
far from thoroughly recognized even in Japan by most of those participating in
this new revolution.
Various aspects of the change can be observed. The Liberal Democratic
Party, which had been sponsored by the main industries and supported by the
majority of the population, lost administrative power in 1993 for the first time in
more than three decades. Yukio Aoshima, TV talent turned politician, was elected Governor of Tokyo in 1995 without support by any of the major political parties. An equally shocking election result was the victory of Knock Yokoyama,
comedian turned politician, in the 1995 gubernatorial campaign of Osaka.
Nobody had predicted their victories because major political parties had cooperated and co-supported a career politician for each governorship. These incidents
apparently suggest a transition of Japanese political values, and other occurrences
indicate further aspects of change: the overseas evacuation of factories triggered
by the evaluation of yen, bank bankruptcies, the abrupt increase of serious crimes
including terrorism, the rapid decrease of birthrate, and so on.
Because the speed of change of the younger generation is the greatest, and
also because their values bear the strongest impact on the future culture of Japan,
this paper focuses upon the values which today's young people are choosing not
to retain. This study is primarily a presentation and analysis of the value shifts
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of Japanese youth. It is my contention that the whole system is now undergoing
major transformation. In order to understand Japanese value systems, it is best to
consider first how Japan underwent other major transformations in the past and
on what ground such nationwide value shifts were possible.
The latest and extreme reconstruction of Japanese value system, and the
entire industrial-social system, began in 1945. It began with the wholesale rejection of the old value system, including the complete shift of values from militarism to pacifism and from imperialism to democratic industrialism, as observed
throughout the villages, towns, and cities of Japan. Many American soldiers who
stationed in Japan immediately after the war witnessed the remarkable transformation from antagonism to friendliness and respect as teachers of new values in
their former enemies.
Japanese values can easily be replaced because myriad gods, which represent
various relative values, have been coexisting for millennia without one absolute
God. Depending on the situation, certain values became dominant over others,
and in return they yielded themselves to other sets of values when the situation
changed. Unlike the absolute values of monotheistic religions, such as Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam, relative values can be casually adopted as a means of
individuals' pursuit of happiness or as the expedient policy of a politheistic
nation. Theoretically speaking, values are not goals or originators of actions in
Japan, where individuals' wants for happiness decide human behavior without
any interference by dieties.
Another example of a thorough shift of values in Japanese history is the
Meiji Restoration (1868), when imperialism and militarism replaced pacifism and
virtual isolation of the Edo Period. The Tokugawa regime's success in keeping
the country peaceful for two-and-a-half centuries was built on the foundations of
disarmament and the values of harmony and social stability. When the powerful
countries of the West threatened Japan at the middle of the nineteenth century,
however, Japan abandoned pacifism and rapidly turned herself into a power-oriented nation. Meiji Japan adopted completely different sets of values, the values
of military power through industrial development to challenge the economic and
political power centers then dominating the world.
Whenever Japan achieved a major transformation, the people had good reason for wanting change. The Tokugawa Shogunate adopted a thorough pacifism
mainly because people resented the turbulent civil strife of preceding times. After
hundreds of peaceful years, however, the Tokugawas yielded their powers to the
Emperor without bloodshed because they knew that people wanted more powerful leaders to avoid the threatening colonization by other countries, especially
after the encounter with United States' Commodore Perry in Uraga Harbor in
1853. The new leaders established a power-oriented system centering on the
Emperor. After becoming involved in the world's power strife, the Japanese
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol35/iss35/2
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pany intensive, large-scale wars, and they finally wholeheartedly accepted the
new constitution which declared the renunciation of war. The wartime shortage
of food and necessities was in fact a major factor in motivating work for industrial survival and economic success.
It is commonly understood that the Japanese values of today include diligence, hard work, and cooperation in a group society, all of which have contributed to economic success. Although valid a few decades ago, the situation is
very different now. In the 1980s, after economic success was achieved to an
extent which surprised all the world, including the Japanese, the more affluent
younger people, now in a very different cultural milieu, began searching for different purposes and goals in life. The recent shift in the value system of Japanese
youth ensued.

2
The transformation of Japanese values can be observed in some statistical
data of surveys of juvenile attitudes. The basic value of Japanese youth can perhaps be seen in sharpest and most significant delineation when contrasted with
those of their counterparts in certain other countries. Attention will be focused on
four categories: work, family, society, and individualism, because the first three
are usually regarded as the representative values in Japan, and individualism as
central in the United States. Japanese are known for being hard workers, or even
notorious as overworkers. Respect for parents had been one of the primary values for Japan, where ancestor worship had been emphasized by all for the past
two thousand years. Society was also a traditional value in Japan, and many individuals had withheld exercise of potential claims to greater freedom for the sake
of greater harmony and peace. On the other hand, Americans consider that an
individual's human rights are the prime value.
Astonishing to most educated people, including social scientists around the
world, is that actuality does not at all accord with long-held, formerly valid
stereotypes. Americans now hold the values of work, family, and society more
highly than Japanese, and Japanese place more importance on the individual's
pursuit of happiness than young Americans do. The reversal of the relative values of Japanese and American youth, which is evident in the surveys of their atitudes, makes the transformation of Japanese values undeniable.

2.1 Work
Figure 1 is extracted from the 1993 survey of college students by Ishii et. al.
Among the three countries he investigated, Koreans topped the percentage of students eager to work devotedly after graduation. Second of the three in this value
is not found in Japan, but the U.S. Only 10% of Japanese students answered that
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1997
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almost a threefold proportion.
Figure 1 Work as a value
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(Ishii et al. 1994: 1993 data)

Figures 2 and 3 are based on the 1993 Japanese governmental survey on the
young generation of 11 countries. The informants, carefully chosen to constitute
an equivalent range and distribution of counterparts, were all 18 to 24. Asked if
they would like to keep their present work for many future years, 38% of
American young workers answered affirmatively, versus only 28% of the
Japanese. An additional 28% of Japanese answered that they may remain with
their present work because of the Japanese traditional assurance of lifetime
employment; but Japanese young workers are not as desirous as Americans of
keeping their present work where no lifetime assurance exists. Though no significant change can be observed in the percentage of American youth during the past
decade, Japanese youth seem to be in the process of losing patience with work,
as Figure 3 implies: ever more Japanese are thinking of changing their work,
despite the typical annual pay raises for those remaining on their present jobs.
Figure 2 Do you plan to keep your present job?
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Figure 3

I would rather change my job.
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As for the quality of work, American youth want responsible jobs more than
their Japanese counterparts (Figure 4). Figure 5 indicates an increasing proportion of those who prefer easy jobs without heavy responsibility in Japan, though
the comparable rate for American youth fluctuates relatively little. The value of
work which once prevailed in Japan is now less popular than in America among
the young generation as far as the figures in these surveys are concerned.

Figure 4 Which work would you prefer?
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(Somucho 1994: 1993 data)

2.2 Family
More conspicuous phenomena of the cultural reversal between Japan and
America are observed in the values of family, especially respect for parents.
According
survey of 1997
college students by Ishii et al.
Publishedto
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Figure 5 I would prefer easy work.
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Figure 6 Respect for parents as a value
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(Figure 6), Korean students respect their parents most, which is very understandable, because Confucianism, which holds "respect for parents" as one of the central values, has for many generations been a greatly emphasized part of Korean
tradition. Japan also accepted Confucianism as one of its overtly apparent but
also unconsciously integrated Confucian value system foundations, though less
thoroughly accepted when introduced to Japan than when rapidly and thoroughly adopted upon arrival in Korea two centuries earlier. What is not readily understandable, however, is the fact that Japan, despite its very strong Confucian influence reinforced by its other traditional emphases on ancestors, especially parents,
now has far fewer students who respect their parents than does America.
The credibility of Ishii et al.'s data is supported by other surveys. Takimoto
et al. compared Japan, the U.S., and Australia in 1990, investigating college6 stuhttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol35/iss35/2
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dents in the three countries. Figure 7 shows the result of Takimoto et al.'s
research. Even in 1990 American students were more positively disposed to supporting their aged parents than were their Japanese counterparts. Figure 8 presents data more recently collected in 1993 by the Japanese government: only 23%
of Japanese youth are thinking of supporting their aged parents, in contrast to
63% of Americans.
The precise question they asked was, "How do you feel about the prospect
of taking care of your parents in their old age?" Showing four cards, they asked
the respondents to choose from the cards the one answer that comes closest to
how they feel. Card 1: "I will take care of my parents regardless of what it takes",
which is labeled as "positively" in the figure. Card 2: "I will care for my parents
as I am financially able to", which is shown as "possibly." Card 3: "I'd prefer to
leave matters to my parents' resources and/or social security," which is omitted in
the figure above, as is Card 4: "I will leave matters to my parents' resources
and/or social security."
Figure 7 Do you plan to support your aged parents?
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Figure 8 Do you plan to support your aged parents?
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The majority of 18- to 24-year-old Japanese are planning to support their parents if financially able. Notwithstanding the difficulty of earning enough money
for themselves, they may eventually support their parents. Even when we take
that possibility into consideration, the view of Japanese youth falls behind that of
the Americans (Figure 8).
Figure 9 shows the chronological change of the valuation of parents. Those
who are positive in supporting their aged parents are increasing in America, while
they are decreasing conspicuously in Japan. The increase of divorce in America
may partly explain the American phenomenon, because anguish, antagonism, and
sorrows in broken families may prompt American youngsters to realize the
importance of strong family ties.

Figure 9 Positive support of aged parents
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Japanese youth, on the other hand, are losing the sense of responsibility to
the family, in my interpretation, probably because of parents' over-indulgence to
children, material affluence, and growing concern for private matters. Their evasion of responsibility for work discussed above (Figure 5) suggests the loss of
concern in anything outside the individuals' inner world of private satisfaction.

2.3 Society
My observation of Japanese youth in daily life suggests their diminishing
social responsibility and growing interest in pleasure and personal satisfaction, as
verified by the governmental survey depicted in Figure 10. The actual question
asked was "Which of the following comes closer to describing your feeling about
the connection between your life and society? (1) The most important thing is to
make my life fulfilling, (2) That alone is not enough; I also want to be of use to
society." The majority of American youth are society-conscious, while as many
as 60% of Japanese youngsters are thinking almost exclusively of their personal

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol35/iss35/2
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lives. This is from the governmental survey. Similar statistical data are reported
by Takimoto et al., who investigated college students in 1990. They compared
results with 1977 data (Figure 11). The 3-point gap between the U.S. and Japan
in 1977 expanded into 11 points in 1990, and the society-conscious youth in
Japan are less than one-third of their American counterpart.
Figure 10 Which is more important for you?
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Figure 11 I will dedicate my life to society.
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Figure 12 is also derived from the 1993 governmental survey of youth aged
18 through 24. Only 11% of the Japanese young generation said that they get personal satisfaction in doing something on behalf of society, while four times as
many, 45%, of Americans said so.
Figure 13 is part of the Ishii et al. study of college students in 1993.
Compared with the 39% of American college students who regard "respect for
elders" as a value of primary importance, the 8% of Japanese students, a fivefold
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contrast, is truly remarkable. As for the value of "respect for ancestors," only
10% of Japanese students consider it a primary value, while 23% of Americans
do, which almost incredibly exceeds the reverse of what most social scientists
would have anticipated. Furthermore, the "well-being of others" as a social value
is of far less concern in Japan than in America as a primary value among college
students. It may be puzzling that Japanese college students maintain such values
as "respect for elders," "respect for ancestors," and "well-being of others" much
less firmly than do students in Korea and America; but these are actually just
refrections of a much broader, general rejection of a broad spectrum of traditional values.
Figure 12 When do you feel satisfied?
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Figure 13 Values of primary importance
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Figure 14 indicates the young citizens' feeling toward their own country.
Those who answered that they would like to do something to serve their country
are 58% in Japan, 72% in America, and 83% in Korea. The American youth are
much more patriotic than Japanese. The gap is even greater in the "positive"
answer which shows the percentage of those who said that they wouldn't mind
sacrificing their own interests in order to serve their country: 37% in America;
only 11% in Japan.

Figure 14 Do you want to serve your country?
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(Somucho 1994: 1993 data)

2.4 Individuality
Japanese youth seem to be actually growing more individualistic and selfcentered than their American counterparts. According to the periodic research in
Japanese values conducted by Seimei Hoken Bunka Center of Japan, part of
whose 1991 data are presented in Figure 15, the Japanese tendency toward individualism and self-centeredness is most conspicuous in the younger generation.
Thirty-three percent of youth aged 25 to 29 can be labeled as being self-centered
in Japan, 42% of those between 20 and 24, and as many as 50%, half of all the
young people from 16 to 19, are now so labeled. "Self-centeredness," or "individualism," in their analysis, is the viewpoint which includes such ideas and attitudes as: (1) I would like to make decisions without considering traditional values. (2) I would like to assert my own opinion even when I stand alone against
the majority. (3) I would like to assert my own rights even when it may make
trouble for others. (4) I would like to do something which attracts others' attention. (5) I would like to spend money on my hobby even when it means that I
have to cut down living expenses. (6) I don't want to do anything I can't enjoy
doing. (7) If I pay attention to all the rights of other people, I'll be disadvantaged.
(8) My happiest moments are when I am absorbed in my hobby or play. (9) Work
is only a means of earning money. (10) I don't feel like doing anything that needs
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much effort or training. (11) I would like to play different roles in accordance
with the situations. (12) I don't want to associate with the people whose ideas are
different from mine. (13) I feel embarrassed doing things seriously (Seimei
Hoken Bunka Center 1993).
Figure 15 Self-centered youth in Japan
19 9 1 d a t a ]

% 0

20

40

60

(Seimei Hoken Bunka Center 1993)

3
Figures 16 and 17 are derived from the 1993 survey of high school students
in Japan, the U.S., and Taiwan (Nihon Seishonen Kenkyusho 1994).
Those who said that they would study now for the future are 47% Japanese
and 65% American. Those who said that they would rather enjoy themselves now
Figure 16 I will study now for the future.
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Figure 17 I will enjoy my life.
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(Nihon Seishonen Kenkyusho 1994: 1993 data)

than study for the future are 52% in Japan and 22% in America. Though interpretation of such data requires consideration of the different situations of the high
school students, the widely accepted image of diligent, hard-working Japanese is
negated by these data of their mental outlook which are acquired through the academic method of surveys, which are also supported by some other research.
The change of American values is not conspicuous, though American youth
are gradually recapturing a part of traditional values such as the values of parents
and family (Figure 9). Japanese youth are apparently losing the traditional values of the immediate past such as work, family, and society, probably because
their hard-working parents' lives do not look at all attractive to the younger generation who live in affluence. It seems that Japanese young generation is now in
a process of a major transformation, one very different from those which preceded it historically, as noted above.
My interpretation is that sometime around 1980 many Japanese, especially
young people, abandoned the values of economic success and began searching
for new sets of values to bring them happiness. The thirteen aspects of new values of self-interest listed above are too disparate and unintegrated to suggest that
they have found any organized value system yet. Most of their values are personal, and their concerns tend to be limited to their private world. However, the
individual's need for happiness is a universal foundation of human life. And
today's Japanese youth are standing upon this universal foundation and seeking
some new set of values which can promise them individual happiness.
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